Archives: Sherlock Holmes and The Story of Disgust - Part II.

Originally published on my old blog - link here.




Why is it that the disgusting is so often moralised? And why is it that moral violations are found disgusting?

Tybur’s functional perspective draws upon principles of evolutionary psychology and provides possible answers to both of these questions. Moral rules are ubiquitous across human societies, and their violations are condemned and punished, but for this to take place the rules have to be first established. Since the need for new moral rules arises rapidly as societies develop, people have to decide what is considered right or wrong before there is enough time to take into account all possible consequences of such decisions.

Disgust, which unlike other emotions (e.g. anger) works devoid of conscious reflection, has a great intuitive appeal and as such it can be used as a tool for endorsement of moral rules. Therefore, actions that invoke pathogen and sexual disgust before they are considered immoral are more likely to become targets of such rules, as their endorsement poses little costs to the individual who would choose not to do the action regardless of its moralised status. For this reason, moral rules and taboos often deal with food consumption, cleanliness, or sexual behaviour. It is important to note that since moral rules are endorsed with the appeal to intuition and the emotion of disgust, they often lack rational justification. For instance, consensual sex between same-sex partners is frequently moralized with appeal to disgust, even though there is no harm done to either party, nor to anyone else.

To illustrate that this mechanism is by no means a thing of the past, we can consider a more recent example articulated by Leon R. Kass who opposed among other things stem-cell research by appealing to disgust. His argument which has become known as the “wisdom of repugnance” is nicely summarised by Kass himself when he stated that “in crucial cases ... repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it”. Now, such rationale (if that’s the right word) is considered to be an example of a reasonless justification and a fallacious appeal to emotion, but it does demonstrate Tybur’s point quite nicely.  

As mentioned previously, there are moral violations which elicit disgust although they are not linked to pathogens or sex, such as those related to harm and unfairness. The functional perspective proposes that disgust is especially effective for coordinating condemnation and endorsing moral rules. If one party is caught violating a potential moral rule (e.g. treating someone unfairly), other individuals might consider this act as immoral and apt for punishment. However, the condemners need support of others as a lone condemnation may lead to costly and prolonged disputes and making of new enemies. If condemnation is coordinated and a new moral rule is endorsed collectively, it in effect reduces the costs imposed on each individual.

Since disgust has already a great intuitive appeal when it comes to condemnation and its facial expression is recognised universally, it may serve as an efficient means to communicate dissatisfaction with certain punishable acts, and consequently persuade others to agree. It has been experimentally demonstrated that incidental disgust may subsequently cause people to make harsher moral judgements, and hence referring to an act using the language of disgust may work in a similar way. What’s more, it seems that perceiving someone as disgusting is akin to perceiving them as less human, thereby countering effects of empathy and making cruel punishment more acceptable.

Taken together, the filmmakers of Sherlock were competent psychologists when deciding to make Magnussen as repulsive as possible prior to his unjust execution. And we should give them credit for that. However, at the same time we ought to be aware of the fact that our emotional moral compass may sway us. This point seems to me very important for it is not only fictional villains that may fall prey to the wisdom of repugnance. As Martha Nussbaum writes: “throughout history, certain disgust properties – sliminess, bad smell, stickiness, decay, foulness – have been repeatedly and monotonously associated with Jews, women, homosexuals, untouchables, lower-class people – all these are imagined as tainted by the dirt of the body”. 

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